This is an extremely well-edited collection of articles dealing with Austin. A number of articles help to present general biographical information and to provide an overview of the man and his philosophic style. Three sections of this anthology are divided so as to include papers that deal with issues raised in Austin's Philosophical Papers, Sense and Sensibilia, and How to Do Thing with Words. Papers are included by those who are sympathetic and admire Austin's work as well (...) as those who have been very critical of his work. Altogether this symposium includes a judicious selection of some of the best articles dealing with Austin. There are papers by Warnock, Urmson, Hampshire, Pears, Cavell, Quine, Chisholm, Ayer, Searle, etc. There is a bibliography of Austin's writings as well as writings about Austin.--R. J. B. (shrink)

During the first half of the present century a number of outstanding philosophers realized that language theory could profitably be viewed as far more than merely a means of studying one among the many human faculties, or merely sharpening the tool we use to philosophize - they realized that there is a sense in which philosophy of language comprises (almost) the whole of philosophy. This was the famous linguistic turn: philosophers came to accept that everything that is is in a (...) sense through language, and that to study what there is is to study what our words mean.1 The enigma of the language-world relationship was brought to the centre of philosophical discussion early in this century by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Austin and others. Their original point was that we cannot take the representing capacities of language at face value, that in order to treat of things - which cannot be done save with the help of words - we must first treat of words and make sure which of them are really capable of treating of things. Thus the philosophers undergoing the linguistic turn slowly gave up asking what is consciousness (matter, evil etc.)? in favour of asking what is the meaning of 'consciousness' ('matter', 'evil' etc.)? This simple turn seemed to have tremendous consequences for philosophy. By replacing the question what is consciousness? by the question what is the meaning of 'consciousness'? we seem to lose nothing (any meaningful answer to the former question seems to be recoverable from an answer to the latter), and yet it seems to take us from the weird realms of mind to the commonplace domain of language, from the troublesome immersing into people's heads to straightforward observing how they use words. It also seems to guard against the "bewitchment of our reason by language" (Wittgenstein) caused by words which are only seemingly meaningful: such questions as what does the word 'ether' stand for? can be answered simply by nothing, whereas the question what is ether? presupposes that there is something as ether (as.... (shrink)

Cavell is one of the most gifted and sensitive philosophers who has been influenced by Wittgenstein and Austin. He is no slavish disciple but an intelligent and perceptive interpreter of the contemporary sensibility. Six of the ten essays have already appeared in print and some have already become intellectual gems. In "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Cavell better than most has managed to capture and convey the spirit and the intensity of the later Wittgenstein. The title essay is (...) the most articulate defense of what ordinary language philosophy can be at its best. But Cavell is also an incisive commentator on Beckett and Kierkegaard. He illuminates a range of aesthetic issues. Cavell's forte is that of an essayist who manages to create in each of his essays a "form of life" within which one can participate and share his insight.--R. J. B. (shrink)

A series of lectures reconstructed by G. J. Warnock from manuscript notes, in which Austin criticizes and exposes some of the standard arguments in the discussion of "sense-data." The cumulative effect of this small classic is to show the confusions which have infected the appeal to "sense-data," and to question the significance of such a concept.--R. J. B.

All too rarely an anthology is put together that reflects imagination, command, and comprehensiveness. Rorty's collection is just such a book. Although primarily concerned with the metaphilosophical issues of precisely what is new and distinctive about the linguistic turn, excellent selections are included from a great variety of orientations. Both the more formalistic approaches of Carnap and Bergmann as well as the more informal perspectives of Ryle, Hampshire, and Austin are well represented. The whole is constructed so that the (...) reader participates in a continuous dialectic of positions bringing us right up to recent discussions of transformational linguistics. There is a masterful introduction which takes a comprehensive look at the entire range of positions, revealing basic similarities and differences as well as locating the chief unresolved problems. A comprehensive bibliography enables the reader to locate almost any important discussion of the issues explored. This book is an ideal supplement for any course dealing with the varieties of analytic and linguistic philosophy. Unfortunately there is no index.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Passmore is one of the most outstanding historians of the contemporary philosophical scene. He seems to have read everything, digested it, and has an uncanny ability to empathize with diverse philosophical viewpoints and elucidate them in a clear, witty, cogent style. Although the first three quarters of this revised edition is basically the same as earlier editions, we now have additions to his account of Ayer, Popper, Wittgenstein and Sartre; enlarged sections on Austin, Jaspers and Heidegger; a new section (...) on Merleau-Ponty and a chapter bringing us right up to the present discussions of the mind-body problem in Anglo-Saxon philosophy. With this revised edition, one feels more acutely the pinch of the limitations that Passmore initially set for himself, viz., to treat the ideas of those writers that entered into the public domain of philosophical discussion in England during the past hundred years. Consequently his treatment of continental thinkers is not nearly as complete or perceptive as his treatment of British philosophers, or his chapters on "classical" American thinkers which are among the best written by anybody.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Considering the vast amount that has been written about "explanation" and "human action," one wonders what remains to be said. But this book is distinguished by the radicalness of the author's point of view. An alternative title might have been, Is Social Science Based On a Mistake? The answer here is an insistent yes. Surveying the social sciences, including psychology, sociology, political science, economics, etc., Louch argues that these disciplines are involved in radical conceptual confusions. The chief difficulty stems from (...) the misguided attempt to impose a univocal theory of generalized explanation on human action. Adapting techniques of Ryle, Austin, and Wittgenstein, Louch argues that "explanation" is a family of cases where there are many types of irreducibly different puzzles and paradigms. Furthermore, in his polemical dismissal of the social sciences, Louch argues that the view of human nature that they foster has pernicious social and moral consequences. The primary reason why human action eludes the distortions of social scientists is because description and explanation of action is possible only by means of moral categories. The concept of human action is itself a moral category where "assessment" terms are essential for its description. While the book is rich in suggestions, too often polemic obscures the need for careful statement and analysis.—-R. J. B. (shrink)

This work should be quite useful as a problem guide to phenomenalist and dualist metaphysics. Professor Yolton is concerned that any system be read both from an internal and an external perspective keeping them as separate and distinct as possible. He also cautions that the external perspective should not presuppose another metaphysic for that has often resulted in gross misreadings of earlier authors. In the first section of the book, phenomenalism, he shows how, for example, D. M. Armstrong and G. (...) Warnock have misread Berkeley and attacks G. Warnock and J. Austin's principle which rules out use of a technical irreducible language by philosophers. Solipsism and idealism as well as Berkeley's sensory phenomenalism are treated. In the second section of the book, dualism, Professor Yolton argues that some "transcendent Meaning Principle" is necessary to make the non-sensual side of dualism intelligible, outlines Plato's dualism as against Protagorian monism, indicates what he considers B. Russell's dualism and tries to show that Russell's treatment of one side is partially completed by C. I. Lewis' treatment of what Professor Yolton considers the other side. In the third section on meaning and truth he tries to establish 1) that there is a large measure of intranslatability between philosophical systems; 2) that meaning involves referrent necessarily; 3) that truth is defined by ontological rules; and 4) that correspondence is the basic truth-relation. Brief discussion is given of certain aspects of the works of P. Strawson, B. Russell, J. S. Mill, G. Ryle, W. V. O. Quine, Meinong, and Eric Tom. Slightly over half of this book is comprised of papers, some slightly modified, published from 1949 to 1961.--J. B. L. (shrink)

Cavell is one of the most gifted and sensitive philosophers who has been influenced by Wittgenstein and Austin. He is no slavish disciple but an intelligent and perceptive interpreter of the contemporary sensibility. Six of the ten essays have already appeared in print and some have already become intellectual gems. In "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Cavell better than most has managed to capture and convey the spirit and the intensity of the later Wittgenstein. The title essay is (...) the most articulate defense of what ordinary language philosophy can be at its best. But Cavell is also an incisive commentator on Beckett and Kierkegaard. He illuminates a range of aesthetic issues. Cavell's forte is that of an essayist who manages to create in each of his essays a "form of life" within which one can participate and share his insight.--R. J. B. (shrink)

In his Preface, Vendler acknowledges the influence of Ziff, who taught him philosophy; Harris, who taught him linguistics; and Austin, who made him see the connection of the two. The influence of these three is manifest in both the philosophical style and content of this book. The opening chapter reviews the dispute between the staunch defenders of ordinary language analysis and the champions of the new transformational linguistics. Vendler sensitively reviews the claims and counterclaims concluding that linguistics is helpful (...) in analytic philosophy "and its empirical source need not sully the transcendental purity of philosophical thought." The chapters that follow set out to show just how linguistics and a sensitive ear for English can help us through the tangle of issues in getting clear about singular terms; quantifiers; verbs and time; facts and events; effects, results, and consequences; and the grammar of goodness. Vendler's inquiries, which may appear oblique, are always directed at those concepts that have been central to philosophy. And in the course of his analyses, even the unsympathetic will probably be provoked and illuminated.—R. J. B. (shrink)

The first of these massive volumes, edited by Aiken, covers American and English philosophy. Royce, Peirce, James, Santayana, and Dewey are given in varying length; there is a chapter from Bradley; and Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Wisdom, Austin, and Whitehead are amply and interestingly represented. Aiken's general introduction is well worth reading, and his special introductions should be helpful to the student. In the second volume Barrett presents a much wider variety of opinion: Positivism, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Marxism, Philosophy of History, (...) and Neo-Orthodoxy. The volumes are well printed.--J. B. S. (shrink)

Sokolowski’s book is a refreshing departure from the norm of much Husserlian literature in English. Neither paraphrase nor summary, it explores and illumines the central and thorniest issues in Husserl’s thought, doing so in lively and graceful language unencumbered by transcendental jargon. The author insightfully draws parallels between Husserl and philosophers in the linguistic tradition such as Austin and Strawson. The binding thread throughout the work is the theme of "being truthful." Through the exploration of Husserl’s texts, Sokolowski aims (...) at describing "what it is to be truthful and to be human, and to show what philosophy is." Husserlian phenomenology may be understood as the systematic and clear reflection on being truthful as it is realized in the natural attitude, but also as it is achieved in philosophy itself, which seeks truth in the unique mode of reflecting upon being truthful. (shrink)

This is an extremely well-edited collection of articles dealing with Austin. A number of articles help to present general biographical information and to provide an overview of the man and his philosophic style. Three sections of this anthology are divided so as to include papers that deal with issues raised in Austin's Philosophical Papers, Sense and Sensibilia, and How to Do Thing with Words. Papers are included by those who are sympathetic and admire Austin's work as well (...) as those who have been very critical of his work. Altogether this symposium includes a judicious selection of some of the best articles dealing with Austin. There are papers by Warnock, Urmson, Hampshire, Pears, Cavell, Quine, Chisholm, Ayer, Searle, etc. There is a bibliography of Austin's writings as well as writings about Austin.--R. J. B. (shrink)

βριс φυτεει τραννον βριс κτλ. Thus the MSS, Schol. and Stobaeus 4.8. 11 . βριν φυτεει τυραννον βριс κτλ. Thus Blaydes, followed recently by R. P. Winnington-Ingram, JHS 91 , 126 = Sophocles. An interpretation , p. 192 ; R. D. Dawe, Sophoclis Tragoediae , i. 156 and Sophocles. Oedipus Rex , pp. 18, 61,182 f. ; R. W. B. Burton, The Chorus in Sophocles' Tragedies , p. 164 ; J. Diggle, CRn.s. 32, 14.

In this era of increased polarization of opinion and contentious disagreement, CRITICAL REASONING presents a cooperative approach to critical thinking and formation of beliefs. CRITICAL REASONING emphasizes the importance of developing and applying analytical skills in real life contexts. This book is unique in providing multiple, diverse examples of everyday arguments, both textual and visual, including hard to find long argument passages from real-life sources. The book provides clear, step-by-step procedures to help you decide for yourself what to believe--to be (...) a consumer of information in our contemporary "world of experts.". (shrink)

This book provides a worthwhile and challenging introduction to scientific and moral issues in germline gene therapy. It contains two parts, dealing with scientific and moral issues respectively. In the first, scientific part, a chapter on what the alternatives to germline therapy are is helpful, especially in pointing out that many of the goals one might want to achieve by using germline therapy may be achieved, at a slighter risk, by using non-genetic technologies such as selective embryo implantation and selective (...) abortion. However, the authors argue that germline therapy may be an option in certain cases in which these alternatives are not viable (page 72). In the second part of the book, moral and political issues in germline therapy are discussed, such as the distinction between therapy and enhancement, potential benefits and harms, rights and responsibilities, justice, our concept of humanness, and public policy issues. The …. (shrink)

ὓβριс φυτε⋯ει τ⋯ραννον ὕβριс κτλ. Thus the MSS, Schol. and Stobaeus 4.8. 11. ὕβριν φυτε⋯ει τυραννον ὕβριс κτλ. Thus Blaydes, followed recently by R. P. Winnington-Ingram, JHS 91, 126 = Sophocles. An interpretation, p. 192 ; R. D. Dawe, Sophoclis Tragoediae, i. 156 and Sophocles. Oedipus Rex, pp. 18, 61,182 f. ; R. W. B. Burton, The Chorus in Sophocles' Tragedies, p. 164 ; J. Diggle, CRn.s. 32, 14.

This examination considers the influence of the seventeenth century Cambridge Platonist Cudworth upon the thought of the late eighteenth century German thinker Herder. It focuses upon Herder's use of Cudworth's philosophy to create a revised version of Spinoza's metaphysics. Both Cudworth and Herder were concerned with the problem of determinism. Cudworth outlined a number of difficulties relating to this problem in the thought of Spinoza and proposed amendments, particularly the introduction of the middle principle of plastik, which would mediate between (...) the Ideas of transcendent reason and mechanical materialism. We find these amendments to Spinoza's philosophy also employed in Herder's contribution to the Pantheism Controversy, in which he too offers a revised Spinozism and introduces his own middle principle of Kraft. This demonstrates an important but under-explored English contribution to a key development in German intellectual history. The Pantheism Controversy was an epoch-making event, helping to bring an end to the German Enlightenment and to inaugurate the Romantic movement. Herder's version of Spinoza's thought revived the philosopher's fortunes, and Herder's notion of Kraft became central to Romantic aesthetics. Finally, Herder's use of Cudworth demonstrates the important but overlooked source of Platonic realism in German Romantic thought. (shrink)

In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant presented a method for discovering what morality requires us to do in any situation and claimed that it is a method everyone can use. The method consists in testing one's maxim against the requirement stated in the formulations of the categorical imperative. There has been endless discussion of the adequacy of Kant's method in giving moral guidance, but there has been little effort to situate Kant's view of ethical method in its (...) historical context. In this paper I try to do so. I take the label "method of ethics" from the work of Henry Sidgwick. A method of ethics, he says, is any rational procedure by which we determine what it is right for an individual to do or what an individual ought to do. Since the moralists I want to consider do not all think of morality as rational, I shall broaden the notion by saying that a method is any systematic or regular procedure, rational or not, by which we determine what morality requires... (shrink)

Girard and Reynolds independently invented System F to handle problems in logic and computer programming language design, respectively. Viewing F in the Curry style, which associates types with untyped lambda terms, raises the questions of typability and type checking. Typability asks for a term whether there exists some type it can be given. Type checking asks, for a particular term and type, whether the term can be given that type. The decidability of these problems has been settled for restrictions and (...) extensions of F and related systems and complexity lower-bounds have been determined for typability in F, but this report is the first to resolve whether these problems are decidable for System F. This report proves that type checking in F is undecidable, by a reduction from semi-unification, and that typability in F is undecidable, by a reduction from type checking. Because there is an easy reduction from typability to type checking, the two problems are equivalent. The reduction from type checking to typability uses a novel method of constructing lambda terms that simulate arbitrarily chosen type environments. All of the results also hold for the λI-calculus. (shrink)

Michael Allen's latest work on the profoundly influential Florentine thinker of the fifteenth century, Marsilio Ficino, will be welcomed by philosophers, literary scholars, and historians of the Renaissance, as well as by classicists. Ficino was responsible for inaugurating, shaping, and disseminating the wide-ranging philosophico-cultural movement known as Renaissance Platonism, and his views on the _Sophist_, which he saw as Plato's preeminent ontological dialogue, are of signal interest. This dialogue also served Ficino as a vehicle for exploring a number of other (...) humanist, philosophical, and magical preoccupations, including the theme of man the artist and creator. (shrink)

The duality between congruence lattices of semilattices, and algebraic subsets of an algebraic lattice, is extended to include semilattices with operators. For a set G of operators on a semilattice S, we have \ \cong^{d} {{\rm S}_{p}}}\), where L is the ideal lattice of S, and H is a corresponding set of adjoint maps on L. This duality is used to find some representations of lattices as congruence lattices of semilattices with operators. It is also shown that these congruence lattices (...) satisfy the Jónsson–Kiefer property. (shrink)

‘Now that all parts and members of the mortal creature had been fashioned into one, seeing that it must be the creature's lot for reasons of necessity to spend its life in the domain of fire and air and that it was like to waste away being continually melted and emptied by their onslaught, the gods contrived reinforcement for it. Blending a being kindred to man's being but with different shapes and senses, they brought it into life, a second kind (...) of living creature. Trees, plants, and seeds are these, and those among them which are cultivated types to-day have arrived at their mild benevolence to man only because they have been civilized by his husbandry; formerly only the wild kinds existed, for these are older than the cultivated. Now everything that is alive, whatever it be, may perfectly correctly and of right be termed ‘a living creature’. The creature now in question has at any rate the third kind of soul which our discourse told us is situated between the midriff and the navel. This kind of soul has nothing of opining or of reasoning mind, but it has sensation of pleasant and painful with attendant desires. For continually it is subject to every impression. Its manner of birth has not granted it the power to revolve by itself in itself upon itself rejecting outside motion and asserting its own and thus by beholding all things by native endowment of soull to reason out aught of its own concerns. So it has life and is not some second being other than a living creature, but it stays fixed, rooted, motionless, for it has never been granted movement of its own initiation.’. (shrink)

What is the function of moral principles within the body of moral knowledge? And what must be the nature of moral principles in order for them to carry out this function? A specific set of answers to these questions is widely accepted among moral philosophers – so widely accepted as almost to constitute a sort of orthodoxy. The answers embody a view of the place of principles within the body of morality which crosses the lines between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Though (...) I have put the question in cognitivist terms and shall discuss it in those terms, I think a similar question and a more or less parallel discussion could be given in non-cognitivist terms. Perhaps the time-honoured debate between the two positions can be suspended, at least temporarily, while we examine, not the nature of morality, but its structure. (shrink)

Although the existence of tachyons is not ruled out by special relativity, it appears that causal paradoxes will arise if there are tachyons. The usual solutions to these paradoxes employ some form of the reinterpretation principle. In this paper it is argued first that the principle is incoherent, second that even if it is not, some causal paradoxes remain, and third, the most plausible “solution,” which appeals to boundary conditions of the universe, will conflict with special relativity.